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A Hawk-Dove game in kleptoparasitic
populations
Mark Broom Roger M. Luther Jan Rychta´rˇ∗
February 8, 2007
Kleptoparasitism, the parasitism by theft, is a widespread biological phe-
nomenon. In this paper we extend earlier models to investigate a population
of conspecifics involved in foraging and, potentially, kleptoparasitism. We
assume that the population is composed of two types of individuals, Hawks
and Doves. The types differ according to their strategic choices when faced
with an opportunity to steal and to resist a challenge. Hawks use every
opportunity to steal and they resist all challenges. Doves never resist and
never steal. The fitness of each type of individual depends upon various
natural parameters, for example food density, the handling time of a food
item, density of the population, as well as the duration of potential fights
over the food. We find the Evolutionarily Stable States (ESSs) for all param-
eter combinations and show that there are three possible ESSs, pure Hawks,
pure Doves, and a mixed population of Hawks and Doves. We show that for
any set of parameter values there is exactly one ESS. We further investigate
the relationship between our findings and the classical Hawk-Dove game as
defined in Maynard Smith 1982. We also show how our model extends the
classical one.
1 Introduction
Kleptoparasitism, is the stealing of prey that has been caught by another
(Rothschild and Clay 1952). The most common observations of kleptopara-
sitism have been amongst birds (Brockmann and Barnard 1979). Kleptopar-
asitic behavior has been observed in many other types of animals as well,
including insects (Jeanne 1972), fish (Grimm and Klinge 1996) and mam-
mals (Kruuk 1972).
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There is now a substantial literature of works using game theoretic models
to investigate kleptoparasitic behavior in nature (eg Barnard and Sibly 1981;
Stillmann et al 1997; Broom and Ruxton 1998; Ruxton and Broom 1999;
Broom and Ruxton 2003).
2 The model, behavioral states and strategies
The basic structure of our model follows that of Broom and Ruxton 1998
and Broom et al. 2007. Individuals forage for food, and can be in one of
four states. They are either a searcher (looking for food, but having yet to
find it), a handler (having found food, preparing to consume it) a challenger
(having come across a handler, trying to steal the food item) or a defender
(trying to resist the challenge of another). We assume that individuals take
an exponential time, with mean th, to handle a food item, and that the food
is consumed in no time at the end of this period.
We consider a polymorphic population consisting of the two different
bird types. A bird’s type is determined by the reaction of an individual to
an encounter with another, where one of the two birds is handling food, and
the other has an opportunity to try to steal it. The types are:
Hawk always attack, always resist when attacked,
Dove never attack, never resist when attacked.
Each bird is initially searching for food items. We assume that Doves find
food at rate νff (where f is the density of food) as opposed to Hawks who
find food at rate νgf . Hawks are searching for handlers as well (at rate νh).
Hawks may thus have to divide their attention between the two searches and
it is possible that because of this that νg < νf . We shall in any case consider
νg and νf to be potentially different, and will also consider the case where
νg ≥ νf . When Hawk finds a handler, it challenges and tries to steal its food.
If it encounters Dove, the handler surrenders the food item. If it encounters
another Hawk, the handler defends its food and thus both the searcher and
the handler engage in a fight. In our model we assume that the only cost
of the fight is the time spent in the contest. The fights take a random time
with exponential distribution with mean ta
2
. The challenger wins the fight
with probability α ∈ (0, 1).
Let P be the total density of the population and Hd, Dd be the densities
of Hawks and Doves, respectively. Both types go through a searching and
handling period, Hawks may be involved in fights as both attackers and
defenders. Let Hs, Hh, Ha, Hr denote the densities of Hawks in searching,
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Parameter meaning
P density of the population
Dd, Hd density of Doves and Hawks
Ds, Hs density of searching Doves and Hawks
Dh, Hh density of handling Doves, and Hawks
Ha density of attacking Hawks
Hr density of defending Hawks
hr handling ratio Hh/P in a population of Hawks only
f density of food items
νf area Doves can search for food per unit time
νg area Hawks can search for food per unit time
νh area Hawks can search for handlers per unit time
th expected time to consume a food item (if undisturbed)
ta
2
expected duration of a fight contest over food
α probability that the challenger wins the fight
Table 1: The model parameters and notation.
handling, attacking and defending states. LetDs andDh denote the densities
of Doves searching and handling. See Table 1 for a summary of our notation.
We assume the total density of the population is constant.
We shall consider each of the strategies in turn and evaluate its uptake
rate in the mixed population. The uptake rate is one divided by the total
time needed for complete consumption (i.e. finding the food item and eating
it, including all possible interruptions by others). The following equation can
be found in Broom and Rychta´rˇ 2006 and determines the total consumption
time T for Hawks (a similar equation holds for Doves).
T = th ·
Hd
Hh
. (2.1)
The uptake rate is thus directly proportional to the proportion of time that
each type of individual spends in the handling state (see Broom and Rux-
ton 1998, amongst other papers). We assume also that the uptake rate is
proportional to the fitness of individuals of that type. This means that, the
shorter the consumption time, the higher the fitness.
3 Equilibrium equations
In this section we will consider each strategy and evaluate its uptake rate
and its consumption time. We use the same approach as in Broom et al.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for Doves.
2007 where methods for dealing with polymorphic populations are developed
in full generality.
3.1 Doves
Doves can go through searching and handling stages only.
If a Dove is searching, it can become a handler if it finds a food item
(with the rate νff). If the Dove is a handler, it can become a searcher if it
finishes handling (with rate t−1h ) or is found by a searching Hawk (with the
rate νhHs). This provides the following set of equations.
d
dt
Ds = t
−1
h Dh + νhHsDh − νffDs (3.1)
d
dt
Dh = −t
−1
h Dh − νhHsDh + νffDs (3.2)
Dd = Ds +Dh (3.3)
These equations tend to equilibrium very fast (see Luther and Broom,
2004). In the equilibrium, both sides of the equations (3.1) and (3.2) are
equal 0 which together with (3.3) provides
Dd
Dh
= 1 +
1
thνff
+
νhHs
νff
. (3.4)
3.2 Hawks
Hawks can go through four different stages - searching, handling, attacking,
and resisting.
If a Hawk is searching, it can become
• a handler if it finds food (with rate νgf) or a handling Dove (with rate
νhDh),
• an attacker if it finds a handling Hawk (with rate νhHh).
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for Hawks.
If the Hawk is handling, it can become
• a searcher if it finishes handling (with rate t−1h ),
• a defender if it is found by a searching Hawk (with rate νhHs).
If the Hawk is attacking, it can become
• a handler if it wins the fight (with rate α( ta
2
)−1),
• a searcher if it loses the fight (with rate (1− α)( ta
2
)−1).
If the Hawk is resisting, it can become
• a searcher if it loses the fight (with rate α( ta
2
)−1),
• a handler if it wins the fight (with rate (1− α)( ta
2
)−1).
It gives the following set of equations (the left sides are set to 0 as the
differential equations again tends to equilibrium very fast Luther and Broom,
2004 as seen already in the Dove case).
0 =
d
dt
Hs = −(νgf + νhDh + νhHh)Hs + t
−1
h Hh + 2(1− α)t
−1
a Ha
+2αt−1a Hr (3.5)
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0 =
d
dt
Hh = −νhHsHh − t
−1
h Hh + (νgf + νhDh)Hs
+2αt−1a Ha + 2(1− α)t
−1
a Hr (3.6)
0 =
d
dt
Ha = −2t
−1
a Ha + νhHhHs (3.7)
0 =
d
dt
Hr = −2t
−1
a Hr + νhHsHh (3.8)
Hd = Hs +Hh +Ha +Hr (3.9)
By (3.10)
Hr = νhHsHh
ta
2
; (3.10)
by (3.9)
Ha = νhHsHh
ta
2
. (3.11)
Consequently,
Ha = Hr
and (3.12), (3.13) and (3.5) yield
(−νgf − νhDh)Hs + t
−1
h Hh = 0 (3.12)
which yields
Hs
Hh
=
1
th(νgf + νhDh)
. (3.13)
Substituting (3.15), (3.12), and (3.13) into (3.11) yields
Hd
Hh
= 1 +
1
th(νgf + νhDh)
+ taνhHs. (3.14)
4 ESSs
We can use the inverse handling ratios from the previous section to estab-
lish conditions when a given strategy has (or has not) an advantage against
another strategy in a general population mixture.
Hawk is better than Dove if
Hd
Hh
<
Dd
Dh
which is by (3.16) and (3.4) equivalent to
1
th(νgf + νhDh)
+ taνhHs <
1
thνff
+
νhHs
νff
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which can be further rearranged to
νff
νgf + νhDh
− 1 < Hsνhth(1− νffta).
By using (3.14), the above can be further simplified to
νff − νgf
νh
−Dh < Hh(1− νffta). (4.1)
Doves are better than Hawks if the opposite inequality holds; and Doves
and Hawks do equally well when the equality holds. The inequality will be
used in the following sections in the classification of ESSs.
We explicitly state the conditions for ESSs. There are three potential
ESSs - Hawks only, Doves only and a mixed population. We will investigate
each one of these in turn.
4.1 Hawk as an ESS
Hawk is an ESS if a population of Hawks only cannot be invaded by a small
amount of Doves. This is equivalent to the requirement that Hawks do better
than Doves in a population consisting of mostly Hawks. By setting Dh ≈ 0
in (4.1) we get that Hawk is ESS if
νff − νgf
νh
< Hh(1− νffta). (4.2)
We can evaluateHh in the population of Hawks only. By combining equations
(3.16) and (3.15) and by using Hd ≈ P and Dh ≈ 0, we arrive (as in Ruxton
and Moody 1997), to Hh = Phr, where hr, the handling ratio, is the positive
root of the quadratic equation
h2rtaνhP + hr(1 + νgfth)− νgfth = 0.
This yields
Hh = hrP =
1 + νgfth
2taνh
·

−1 +
√√√√1 + 4taνhthPνgf
(1 + νgfth)2

 , (4.3)
which can be used for determining conditions on P from conditions on Hh.
We can conclude that Hawk is ESS for either one of the following sets of
parameter values:
• νff ≤ min(νgf, t
−1
a ) and P arbitrary,
• νgf < νff , νffta < 1 and P high (satisfying (4.2)),
• νff > νgf , νffta > 1 and P small (satisfying (4.2)).
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4.2 Dove as an ESS
Dove is an ESS if a population of Doves only cannot be invaded by a small
amount of Hawks. This is equivalent to the requirement that Doves do better
than Hawks in a population consisting of mostly Doves. By setting Hh ≈ 0
in (4.1) we get that Dove is ESS if
Dh <
νff − νgf
νh
. (4.4)
Since, by (3.4), for Hs ≈ 0,
Dh =
thνff
thνff + 1
P,
we get that Dove is an ESS if
P <
νff − νgf
νh
·
thνff + 1
thνff
. (4.5)
In particular, Dove can be an ESS only if νgf < νff , i.e. Doves find food
faster than Hawks. And even then, only if νhDh is smaller than νff − νgf ,
i.e. the rate that Hawks find handling Doves is smaller than the Dove’s
advantage in finding food. Another interpretation is that this occurs only in
sufficiently small populations (small populations do not give kleptoparasitic
invaders a chance of finding a handler very fast).
4.3 Mixed ESS
The necessary condition on a mixed ESS to exist is that both types, Dove
and Hawk, do equally well in the mixture. It means
νff − νgf
νh
−Dh = Hh(1− νffta)
which can be further rearranged to
Hd
P
=
νgf − νff + νhDh
νgf − νff + νhDhνffta
(4.6)
Note that Hd
P
should be in [0, 1]. Thus, we can conclude that mixed ESS
does not occur for some parameter choices - for example if νgf > νff and
νffta < 1.
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If νff = νgf , then the equation (4.6) reduces to
Hd
P
=
1
νffta
. (4.7)
We will see in the next sections how this result relates to the classical Hawk-
Dove game (Maynard Smith, 1982).
The mixed ESS occurs whenever Hawk is not an ESS and Dove is not an
ESS. Indeed, if we regard Hd
Hh
−
Dd
Dh
as a function of a fraction of Hawks in the
population, then this function is continuous and is positive in Hawks only
population (Hawk is not an ESS, i.e. Doves can invade, i.e. Doves do better)
whereas negative in Doves only population. Hence, there must be a root in
between. It turns out that Hd
Hh
−
Dd
Dh
is a cubic function of the fraction of
Hawks and thus there could theoretically be three roots. Numerical experi-
ments, however, confirm that there is always at most one root in (0, 1). This
seems plausible since the function should be monotone - the fraction of Hawk
handlers increases and fraction of Dove handler decreases as the fraction of
Hawks increases (Hawks are more and more engaged in fights, whereas Doves
have to give up the food to Hawks).
We can conclude that mixed ESS occurs if and only if neither Dove nor
Hawk is ESS.
4.4 Dependence on parameters
There are 8 parameters of our model: νf , νg, f, th, ta, νh, P , and α. From the
previous sections, it is clear that we can consider parameters νff and νgf
rather than νf , νg and f . Also, the outcomes do not depend on α at all. If
we are interested in overall patterns rather than exact numbers, there is no
direct dependence on th and νh. The patterns of ESS depend on νff, νgf, ta,
and P only. As follows from (4.2) and (4.4), if we fix νgf and ta, the outcomes
differ based on the relative position of νff with respect to νgf and t
−1
a . The
table 2 summarizes the results.
Observe that Hawk and Dove are never ESS together. It follows from
equations (4.4) and (4.2), since the fraction of Dove handlers in Dove only
population is always greater that the fraction of Hawk handlers in Hawk only
population (because Hawks are also engaged in fights).
We already noted that Hd
Hh
−
Dd
Dh
is a monotone function of a fraction of
Hawks. Thus, we can conclude that there is always at most one ESS. By
checking all possible cases, we see that there is always at least one ESS.
Thus, there is always exactly one ESS for any parameter values.
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size of νff Hawk Dove mixed ESS
νff ≤ νgf < t
−1
a always never never
νgf < νff < t
−1
a for high P for small P for P in between
νgf < t
−1
a < νff never for small P for high P
νff ≤ t
−1
a < νgf always never never
t−1a < νff ≤ νgf for small P never for high P
t−1a < νgf < νff never for small P for high P
Table 2: Dependence of ESS patterns on parameter values. Condition on P
in Hawk column refer to inequality (4.2), conditions on P in Dove column
refer to (4.5), conditions on P in mixed ESS column are complements of the
first two.
5 The classical Hawk-Dove game
The classical Hawk-Dove game is a two player matrix game with a payoff
matrix
Hawk Dove
Hawk V/2− C/2 V
Dove 0 V/2
where V denotes the value of the food and C denotes the cost of the fight
over the food. The entries of the matrix reflect the fact that when Hawk
encounters Hawk, one of them will get a resource of value V whereas the
second will will bear the cost of the fight C (or, equivalently, both will bear
a cost of the fight C/2). When Hawk meets Dove, Hawk gets the whole
resource while Dove gets nothing. Finally, when Dove meets Dove, they
“split”.
It can be calculated (see, e.g., Maynard Smith 1982) that if there is a
mixed ESS, the fraction of Hawks in the population, Hd
P
, equals to V
C
.
In the setting of our model of kleptoparasitic behavior, the value of a
food is the time needed to find it. If we assume that νff = νgf , then for
both, Hawk and Dove, the value is V = (νff)
−1. The cost of the fight is the
time both Hawks spend fighting. Since each of them spends time ta
2
, we have
C
2
= ta
2
. In total, the mixed ESS occurs for
Hd
P
=
1
νffta
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which is in an agreement with (4.7).
6 Discussion
In this paper we have developed the game-theoretic model of kleptoparasitism
introduced in Broom and Ruxton (1998). Individuals are one of the two
strategy types, Hawks and Doves, depending upon whether they fight for
food or not. There is a difference in the foraging rates of fighters and non-
fighters (perhaps because non-fighters can concentrate on searching for food
rather than food and conspecifics).
We have found general expressions for the fitness of each strategy in a
general population mixture, and then found conditions for which each of the
pure strategies or mixed states are ESSs. Whether a strategy is an ESS or not
of course depends upon the values of the population parameters (see Tables
1 and 2). Both strategies can be ESSs; a mixed ESS is also possible. There
is always exactly one ESS. The existence of the mixed Hakw-Dove ESS is a
new result that has not been (and in fact, could not be) captured by another
model for polymorphic populations (see Broom et al. 2007).
We have also shown that our model extends the classical Hawk-Dove
game. Although in a general agreement with the classical model, our model
can capture a variety of parameters and distinguish between different scenar-
ios. One of the most important advantages of our model is the explicit use of
a population density. Note that the classical Hawk-Dove game model is in-
dependent of the population size, while our model can produce different (and
logical) outcomes even if all other parameters are fixed and only population
size varies.
The most interesting behavior occurs when νgf < νff < t
−1
a , i.e. if Doves
search for food faster than Hawks, and the fights do not take too long. Under
these conditions, as the population size increases, the ESS shifts from pure
Dove through mixed ESS to pure Hawk. Dove is ESS in small populations.
Hawks cannot invade Doves in small population since they are not able to
find food as fast as Doves are and yet they cannot steal too much from
Doves since the density of Doves is small. As soon as the population size
increases above certain threshold (described by (4.5)), Hawks can invade due
to the fact that they can steal from Doves. If the population size is not too
big, pure Hawk cannot be ESS. Indeed, Hawks could be invaded by Doves
- they find food relatively fast, do not spend time by fighting and yet they
do not have to give up the food so often as there are still not too many
Hawks. However, once the population size increases above another threshold
(described by (4.2) and (4.3)), Hawks become ESS - Doves cannot invade
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since they are almost constantly attacked by Hawks. As a matter of fact, in
large populations and under these parameters, Hawks are always better than
Doves regardless of the fractions of Hawks in the populations. If there are
enough Hawks, they do better because Doves has to give up food too much.
If there are enough Doves, Hawks do better because the can steal the food
rather than having to find it by themselves.
We also note that our model can be further extended by incorporating
other types of behavior, namely Retaliator (do not challenge but resist steal-
ing) and Marauder (steal but do not resist). This is done in detail in Broom
et al. 2007.
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